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DO SCHOOL CLIQUES DOMINATE JAPANESE 
BUREAUCRACIES?: EVIDENCE FROM SUPREME 
COURT APPOINTMENTS 
J. MARK RAMSEYER

 
ABSTRACT 
Scholars (for example, Chalmers Johnson) routinely argue that 
university cliques dominate Japanese firms and bureaucracies. The 
graduates of the most selective schools, they explain, control and 
manipulate their employers. They cause them to hire from their alma 
mater. They skew internal career dynamics to favor themselves. 
For most firms and bureaucracies, we lack the data on employee-level 
output necessary to test whether cliques do skew career tournaments. 
Because judges publish opinions, within the courts we may have what we 
need. In this Article, I use data on published opinions to test whether 
Japanese judges from the most selective schools are more likely—holding 
output constant—to reach the Supreme Court. They are not. I find only 
weak evidence of possible favoritism toward Kyoto University graduates, 
and no evidence of favoritism toward University of Tokyo graduates. 
Japanese judges do not find themselves named to the Court because of 
their school backgrounds. They find themselves named there because they 
are unusually productive. 
INTRODUCTION 
Among American scholars, elite Japanese universities have a bad 
name. Forget how well the schools do or do not teach. Forget what 
research they do or do not produce. According to many American 
observers, they foster among their graduates a relentless exclusivity. Those 
graduates then form cliques, encourage their employers to hire even more 
graduates from their alma mater, and manipulate career tournaments to 
preserve favored posts for themselves.  
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To test this school-clique hypothesis, we need employee-level 
information on output: how much each employee produces. The elite 
university graduates did pass entrance examinations that others failed, 
after all. They might be smarter than their rivals. They might work harder. 
Before we can attribute any career success to cliques, we need to know the 
quantity and quality of the work that they do on the job. For most 
corporate and government positions, we have no such information. 
Within the courts, arguably we do have that employee-level work 
product: we know the opinions a judge publishes. To test the school-clique 
hypothesis, I thus ask whether the judges from the elite universities enjoy 
more successful careers than their output would warrant. The quantity and 
quality of their opinions held constant, are they more likely to be named to 
the Supreme Court?  
They are not. I find only weak evidence of any favoritism toward 
Kyoto University graduates, and no evidence of favoritism toward the 
graduates of the preeminent University of Tokyo. Elite university 
graduates do not dominate Supreme Court appointments because of their 
school backgrounds. They dominate because they produce.  
In Part I, I summarize the American literature on Japanese school 
cliques. In Part II, I outline the structure of the Japanese courts; in Parts 
III.A and III.B, I summarize my data; and in Parts III.C and III.D, I report 
my results. In Part IV, I conclude by discussing some possible limitations, 
and in Part V, I discuss alternative measures of career success. 
I. JAPANESE SCHOOL CLIQUES IN THE ACADEMIC IMAGINATION 
A. The Possibility
1
 
Whether in the American scholarly literature or in the Japanese 
newspapers, ―school cliques‖ (known as ―gakubatsu‖) dominated 
traditional Japan. They dominated firms. They dominated the government. 
And at least until some recent politically driven experiments, no clique 
dominated any place as thoroughly as the graduates of the University of 
Tokyo dominated the bureaucracy. 
Elite Japanese universities select their students almost exclusively (the 
exceptions involve departments like physical education or the fine arts) 
 
 
 1. On traditional legal training in Japan, see J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, 
JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 1–21 (1999) and Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & 
Eric B. Rasmusen, The Industrial Organization of the Japanese Bar: Levels and Determinants of 
Attorney Income, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 460 (2010). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/13
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through a blindly graded examination. Each school writes and administers 
its own. Some universities now cooperate on the first stage of an entrance 
examination. Even they, however, write their own distinctive—and 
determinative—second stage. Most universities write exams that test 
material mastered. A few (e.g., the University of Tokyo) write exams that 
test raw cognitive power. 
Exam difficulty correlates with school prestige. The harder students 
find it to pass an exam, the higher everyone unofficially ranks the school. 
And the higher the rank, the more strongly employers compete to hire its 
graduates. Traditionally, the national University of Tokyo enjoyed 
preeminent status in nearly all academic departments. The national Kyoto 
University ranked second. A few national universities and private 
Tokyo-area schools filled the next tier. 
According to American scholars (and commentators in the Japanese 
popular media), in the world beyond the university, the graduates of the 
elite schools look out for their own. They talk with each other. They 
mentor. They help. They lobby their employers to hire still more 
graduates. And they manipulate internal processes to promote fellow 
graduates over those from rival schools. 
These school cliques, declares the late Berkeley and UC San Diego 
political scientist Chalmers Johnson, constitute ―without question the 
single most important influence within the Japanese state bureaucracy. The 
cliques of university classmates are inseparable from bureaucratic life 
. . . .‖2 Among the schools, none allegedly ―does cliques‖ more effectively 
than the University of Tokyo. Explains Johnson, ―[i]n place of the term 
gakubatsu, some Japanese analysts prefer Tōdaibatsu (cliques of Tokyo 
University classmates) because of the predominance of Tokyo University 
graduates in the bureaucracy and in the upper echelons of the banking and 
industrial worlds.‖3 
To observers like Johnson, the cliques rig not just initial hiring 
decisions but later career moves, too. ―Tōdai classmates in and out of 
government keep in touch with each other,‖ he writes.4 Tribal through and 
through, they are nothing if not corrupt. ―Once in the bureaucracy,‖ 
declares Johnson, ―the Tōdai group in an entering class in a ministry 
 
 
 2. CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL 
POLICY, 1925–1975, at 57 (1982). 
 3. Id. at 59. 
 4. Id. at 60. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1684 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:1681 
 
 
 
 
works together to ensure that its members prosper and that others are 
frozen out of choice positions.‖5  
The late University of Washington legal scholar Dan Henderson echoes 
Johnson: the University of Tokyo graduates are successful, tribal, and 
successful because they are tribal. They ―respect and promote each other‘s 
interests,‖ he explains.6 ―[O]ne major irregularity evident in the high levels 
of the civil service is the favoritism (even clearer than in the hiring) shown 
for the Tokyo University (Tōdai) law graduates.‖7 As evidence, he cites a 
study finding Tokyo graduates were ―promoted faster (seven years on the 
average) and higher than law graduates from other universities.‖8 As a 
consequence, ―nearly 80 percent of the entire ‗higher civil service‘ . . . are 
Tōdai graduates.‖9  
Sociologist B.C. Koh confirms the fact that University of Tokyo 
graduates thrive. Within government bureaucracies, he writes, ―the 
proportion of Tōdai graduates is correlated with position level. That is to 
say, the higher the position level, the greater the proportion of Tōdai 
graduates.‖10 Or consider, he explains, the Universities of Tokyo and 
Kyoto as a group. ―The two universities together account for seven in ten 
higher civil servants overall, and their share of the pot increases to 89 
percent at the bureau-chief level and to 95 percent at the vice-ministerial 
level.‖11  
The courts constitute one such government bureaucracy, and many 
observers find similar cliques there. University of Tokyo cliques dominate 
the Ministry of Finance, and they allegedly dominate the courts. Among 
potential recruits, courts do seem to favor University of Tokyo graduates. 
In the private bar, fewer than 16% of all lawyers come from the University 
of Tokyo.
12
 Of the 247 judges hired from 1959 to 1961, 23% were 
University of Tokyo graduates.
13
  
 
 
 5. Id. at 62. 
 6. DAN FENNO HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN: LAWS & POLICIES 209 (1973). 
 7. Id. at 211.  
 8. Id.  
 9. Id.  
 10. B.C. KOH, JAPAN‘S ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE 139–40 (1989). 
 11. Id. at 142. 
 12. Nakazato, Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 1, at 471 tbl.3. 
 13. See infra Table 1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/13
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TABLE ONE: SELECTED SUMMARY STATISTICS (CLASSES OF 1959–61)14 
A. Means and Medians: 
 n Min Mean Median Max 
Tokyo U 247 0  .227  0  1 
Kyoto U 247 0  .174  0  1 
Flunks 245 0  4.131  3 31 
Low Flunks (<3) 245 0  .371  0  1 
TDC Start 245 0  .081  0  1 
      
D Ct tenure 247 0 19.398 10.5 37.583 
TDC Tenure 247 0  3.277  2.0 20.417 
      
D Ct Productivity 243 0  1.714  1.254 11.027 
TDC Productivity 131 0  2.882  1.400 20.000 
Priv Rptr Prod‘y 243 0  .922  .527  6.551 
 
B. Correlation Coefficients (with p-values): 
 Tokyo U Kyoto U Flunks 
TDC 
Start 
DC 
Prod‘y 
TCD 
Prod‘y 
Priv Rp 
Prod‘y 
Tokyo U  1.00       
 
Kyoto U 
 
 -.25 
(0.00) 
 
 1.00 
 
 
    
Flunks  -.069 
(0.28) 
 -.030 
(0.64) 
 1.00     
TDC Start  .158 
(0.01) 
 -.019 
(0.77) 
 -.177 
(0.01) 
1.00    
DC Prod‘y  .185 
(0.00) 
 -.028 
(0.67) 
 -.176 
(0.01) 
 .257 
(0.00) 
 1.00   
TDC Prod‘y  .161 
(0.07) 
 -.012 
(0.89) 
 -.069 
(0.43) 
 .142 
(0.11) 
 .843 
(0.00) 
 1.00  
Pr Rp Pr‘y  .189 
(0.00) 
 -.003 
(0.96) 
 -.132 
(0.04) 
 .252 
(0.00) 
 .893 
(0.00) 
 .778 
(0.00) 
1.00 
 
 
 14. Sources: HANREI TAIKEI [COMPENDIUM OF CASES] (Daiichi Hōki CD-ROM, 2010); ZEN 
SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SŌRAN [CAREER DATA ON ALL JUDGES] (Nihon minshu hōritsuka kyōkai, 4th ed. 
2004). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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And once in the courts, Tokyo and Kyoto graduates rise quickly to 
favored posts.
15
 They spend more time in Tokyo and less in the provinces. 
They spend more time in prestigious assignments and less in branch 
offices. They control more powerful administrative posts and climb the 
pay scale more quickly. Among the twenty lower-court judges educated 
after the war and promoted to the Supreme Court by 2002, twelve 
graduated from the University of Tokyo and six from Kyoto.
16
 
Washington University legal scholar David Law similarly notes (and the 
data confirm) that the prime candidates for the Supreme Court do tend to 
have attended the Universities of Tokyo or Kyoto. In the course of his 
discussion, Law focuses on the ―grooming‖ that potential Supreme Court 
appointees undergo:  
 At any given time, it will be possible to determine from [a given 
judge‘s] career to date whether he is a viable candidate for the 
Supreme Court. If he is in serious contention, he will have been 
groomed, or rewarded, with a series of assignments that place him 
firmly upon an elite career trajectory that would include many, if 
not most, of the following professional highlights. After compiling a 
distinguished academic career at the University of Tokyo (Todai) or 
Kyoto University (Kyodai), or possibly Chuo University, and 
achieving one of the top scores on the bar exam, he attends the 
LTRI and is then posted immediately or very soon thereafter to the 
Tokyo District Court. He will develop expertise in a particular area 
of law, be it civil, criminal, or administrative, and will at some point 
be tapped to serve as a law clerk, or chōsakan, at the Supreme 
Court.
17
  
 
 
 15. See J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN 12–13 (2003) [hereinafter RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE]; J. Mark Ramseyer, Predicting Court Outcomes Through Political 
Preferences: The Japanese Supreme Court and the Chaos of 1993, 58 DUKE L.J. 1557, 1568 (2009) 
[hereinafter Ramseyer, Predicting Court Outcomes]; J. Mark Ramseyer, Sex Bias in the Japanese 
Courts, in EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 2008, at 197, 202 (Kuo-Chang Huang ed., 2009) 
[hereinafter Ramseyer, Sex Bias]; J. Mark Ramseyer, Talent Matters: Judicial Productivity and Speed 
in Japan, 31 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2011) (draft dated Oct. 2010) (on file with the 
Washington University Law Review) [hereinafter Ramseyer, Talent Matters]; J. Mark Ramseyer & 
Eric B. Rasmusen, The Case for Managed Judges: Learning from Japan After the Political Upheaval 
of 1993, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1879, 1890 (2006) [hereinafter Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Managed Judges]. 
 16. ZEN SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN [CAREER DATA ON ALL JUDGES] (Nihon minshu horitsuka 
kyokai, 4th ed. 2004). 
 17. David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 1545, 1557 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/13
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Law then elaborates at length on the type of other assignments elite judges 
routinely receive.
18
 
B. The Puzzle 
But do University of Tokyo graduates really rig the system? Many 
University of Tokyo graduates do enjoy spectacularly successful careers. 
Yet many also bring a spectacular reservoir of talent. Given that talent, 
they would receive attractive job offers whether the hiring was rigged or 
not. They would succeed in internal promotion tournaments whether 
rigged or not. And in truth, observers have never shown that Tokyo 
graduates actually rig procedures to favor each other anyway. They show 
simply that they outperform their competitors. Journalists then find 
passed-over employees from other schools who announce that their 
University of Tokyo rivals manipulated the tournaments that they lost, and 
American scholars repeat the claims.  
The point is obvious, but perhaps worth stressing: University of Tokyo 
students passed the most selective university exam in the country. Students 
do not pass it by accident. They pass it by combining extraordinarily high 
cognitive skills with a willingness to work relentlessly hard. They bring IQ 
and effort—and the two attributes are characteristics employers 
everywhere find valuable in the extreme.  
As a result, the University of Tokyo graduates might simply do well 
because they are smart and work hard. They might do well on the job 
market because school cliques control hiring—but they might also do well 
because employers like smart and hard-working recruits. They might do 
well in the internal promotion tournaments because their clique controls 
the tournaments—but they might also do well because they outperform 
everyone else.
19
  
Absent independent, employee-level data on work product, we cannot 
know. To tell whether cliques control hiring and promotions within 
Japanese organizations, we cannot rely on journalists. We cannot 
 
 
 18. Id.  
 19. Scholars in sociology and elsewhere have accumulated an impressive amount of scholarship 
consistent with the claim that employees tied to social networks are more productive than others. See, 
e.g., Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360 (1973). Given both that 
judges work either alone or on three-judge panels, and that the assignment of cases to a judge within a 
given court is generally random, I do not see how ties to any social network would increase the 
productivity of a Japanese judge. This literature may well apply in some situations; I do not see why it 
would apply here.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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interview employees who wanted the posts University of Tokyo graduates 
took.  
Instead, to tell whether university cliques control organizations, we 
need independent evidence on the quality and quantity of work that the 
graduates of the various schools perform. For virtually all firms and 
agencies, we will have no information on the output of individual workers. 
What is more, once an employer promotes one worker beyond his rivals, 
the members of his cohort will not be performing the same work anyway.  
C. The Courts as a Test 
In the courts, however, we may indeed have the data we need to 
compare output across employees. Obviously, a government that rigs 
promotions in the Ministry of Finance will not necessarily rig them in the 
courts. Yet the empirical inquiry must start somewhere, and, in the courts, 
we arguably have the data we need to begin. A district judge is a district 
judge. He tries cases and decides them. Within any given district court 
(other than on specialized panels like intellectual property), he hears cases 
assigned to him randomly. The more able and hard working he is, the 
more cases he will handle and the less often he will be reversed. 
From public records, I know the pace at which each Japanese judge 
climbs the career hierarchy. Generally, judges join the courts at the outset 
of their careers and stay until shortly before retirement age. From their job 
records, I can gauge their promotions.  
Through other public records, I can also measure the quality and 
quantity of a judge‘s work. I know how many opinions the judge writes 
per year, and I know whether higher courts reverse them. The exercise 
raises obvious problems of selection bias (discussed in Part IV, below). 
But subject to several caveats, note that elsewhere, I similarly find that 
University of Tokyo graduates publish more opinions than graduates of 
other schools.
20
 
II. THE JAPANESE COURT SYSTEM 
Do judges who graduated from the University of Tokyo succeed in the 
career tournaments because their fellow graduates rig the administrative 
apparatus in their favor—as scholars like Johnson and Henderson imply? 
Or do they succeed because they out-perform everyone else? To test the 
hypotheses, I ask which judges cap their careers with appointments to the 
 
 
 20. Ramseyer, Talent Matters, supra note 15. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/13
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Supreme Court. I first collect information on the backgrounds, 
productivity, and careers of a cohort of judges. I then contrast those who 
eventually became Supreme Court Justices with those who did not.  
To check the robustness of the results, in Part V, I use the data for three 
other purposes: (a) to contrast judges who became High Court presidents 
with those who did not, (b) to contrast judges who became district court 
chief judges with those who did not, and (c) to contrast the University of 
Tokyo graduates with the graduates of other universities among the 
fast-track judges who began their careers at the Tokyo District Court. 
A. Lower Courts
21
 
1. Introduction 
Preliminarily, consider the architecture of the Japanese court system. 
Japanese judges work within a career bureaucracy. Where they toil, what 
they do, and how much they earn depend on how highly the officers in the 
court‘s administrative office, the Secretariat, regard their work (hence the 
claim that University of Tokyo graduates can rig the system). Those 
officers, in turn, are themselves career judges, albeit very successful ones. 
Of the many posts at which a career judge can spend some time, service in 
the Secretariat is one of the most prestigious. 
The judges in the Secretariat select the new judges that the court will 
hire. Nominally, the Cabinet appoints the judges, but in fact the Cabinet 
relies on the Secretariat. The Secretariat chooses its new recruits 
immediately after they graduate from the one national law school, the 
Legal Research and Training Institute (LRTI). Although critics urge it to 
hire practicing lawyers, to date, it has seldom done so. 
2. Training 
The system by which students become lawyers, judges, and prosecutors 
recently changed in several ways. Because I compare judges who 
eventually became Supreme Court Justices with those who did not, I focus 
on judges hired several decades ago. As a result, the recent changes do not 
affect the discussion here. 
 
 
 21. This general introductory material is taken from RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE, supra note 15, at 7–16; Ramseyer, Predicting Court Outcomes, supra note 15, at 
1563–69; Ramseyer, Sex Bias, supra note 15, at 201; Ramseyer, Talent Matters, supra note 15; and 
Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Managed Judges, supra note 15, at 1881–89. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The system goes as follows: 
The LRTI . . . admits students on the basis of a (mostly blindly 
graded) annual examination. During the period in question (the 
system recently changed), the pass rate on this exam hovered below 
3 percent. Most people who took it never passed, and those who did 
typically passed only after failing it five or six times first.  
 Students in Japan who would become lawyers, judges, or 
prosecutors usually studied law as an undergraduate subject. They 
then took the entrance examination to the LRTI. If they passed, they 
studied there for two years (recently changed). Upon graduation, 
they took jobs in private practice, on the bench, or in the 
prosecutorial office. Those who never passed typically worked in 
the legal departments of the large corporations.
22
 
3. District and High Courts 
―Most years, the Secretariat hire[s] 70 to 130 new judges a year. Over 
the course of their careers, these judges move[] through a series of 
appointments, generally at three-year intervals.‖23 In the district courts, 
they hear cases alone, except for serious crimes, appeals from summary 
courts, and the more major civil cases. The latter group of cases they hear 
on three-judge panels.
24
 Because court reporters disproportionately publish 
the more important cases, about two-thirds of the published opinions in 
district court civil cases involve three-judge panels.
25
 The intermediate 
appellate courts are known as the high courts. These courts hear all cases 
as three-judge panels.
26
 When judges hear cases on panels, the most senior 
judge structures the trial and determines the pace at which the panel will 
decide the case.
27
  
―Virtually all [judges] spen[d] some time in courts considered 
undesirable, and virtually all also spen[d] time in coveted Tokyo or Osaka 
appointments. The more talented the judge, the more time he spen[ds] in 
urban courts‖ and prestigious administrative jobs like the Secretariat 
 
 
 22. Ramseyer, Talent Matters, supra note 15, at 3–4.  
 23. Id. at 4. 
 24. Saibansho ho [Courts Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 26 (Japan). 
 25. This figure is based on cases decided in early 2000. 
 26. Saibansho ho [Courts Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 18 (Japan). 
 27. Ramseyer, Talent Matters, supra note 15, at 11. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/13
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itself.
28
 The more ordinary his abilities, the more years he spends in 
undesirable courts. 
Lower court judges face mandatory retirement at sixty-five. Shortly 
before turning sixty-five, a judge with respectable ability will typically 
find himself appointed chief judge to a district court. He will serve several 
years and then retire. A star will find himself appointed ―president‖ (i.e., 
chief judge) of one of the seven high courts (i.e., intermediate appellate 
courts). A very select few will find themselves named to the Japanese 
Supreme Court. I discuss these appointments further in Part V. 
B. Supreme Court
29
 
Fifteen Justices serve on the Japanese Supreme Court. There, they hear 
cases either on five-judge panels or, exceptionally, en banc. They receive 
their appointments from the Prime Minister, usually when they are in their 
early sixties. They face retention elections from time to time, but no 
Justice has ever received a substantial negative vote. They serve until 
mandatory retirement at age seventy. 
Of the fifteen Justices, by custom, the Prime Minister names five or six 
from the lower courts. The others bring backgrounds in the bureaucracy, 
the prosecutorial office, the bar, and the professoriate. Although lower 
court judges never write dissents, Supreme Court Justices may, but seldom 
do. 
III. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 
A. Introduction
30
 
When the courts hire a new group of judges, the Secretariat can consult 
three types of information about each new hire‘s talent: (i) the selectivity 
of the university he attended; (ii) his year of birth, from which it can 
calculate how often he probably failed the LRTI exam; and (iii) the quality 
of his work product as reported by supervising judges, because LRTI 
students spend time as interns in the judiciary. 
Traditionally, the Secretariat took those new judges that it considered 
most talented and appointed them to the Tokyo District Court for their first 
 
 
 28. Id. at 4. 
 29. For a fuller discussion of appointments to the Japanese Supreme Court, see HIROSHI ITOH, 
THE SUPREME COURT AND BENIGN ELITE DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN 197–240 (2010), and Ramseyer, 
Predicting Court Outcomes, supra note 15. 
 30. See generally RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 15. 
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three-year term (I consider this further in Part V.D.). Thereafter, it moved 
them through a variety of other courts and positions. As a result, an initial 
appointment to the Tokyo District Court signalled that the Secretariat had 
placed a judge on a ―fast-track‖ within the courts. 
I have some, but not all, of the information available to the Secretariat. 
For most (not all) judges, I know the university he attended (item (i)). I 
know a judge‘s age, and can estimate how often he failed the LRTI exam 
(item (ii)). And although I do not directly know the quality of his work 
product during his LRTI internship (item (iii)), I know where the 
Secretariat started him. Given that the Secretariat decides whether to start 
a judge at the Tokyo District Court on the basis of all three factors, I thus 
have an indirect measure even of a judge‘s performance at the LRTI. 
B. Data and Variables 
1. Data 
I take the information on a judge‘s tenure, background, and 
appointments from the fourth edition of the Zen saibankan keireki soran 
[Career Data on All Judges] (ZSKS), published by the Nihon minshu 
horitsuka kyokai in 2004.
31
 The book is used routinely by observers of the 
Japanese courts. I know of no claims of systematic bias and no evidence of 
significant inaccuracies. 
I obtain information on judicial output from the Hanrei taikei, the 
electronic database maintained by the Daiichi Hōki firm. Like Westlaw 
and Lexis, Hanrei taikei provides all published opinions in electronic 
form.
32
 Some of those opinions originally appeared in private 
commercially published reporters like the Hanrei jihō and Hanrei taimuzu. 
Others appeared in reporters published by the courts.  
Japanese district court judges write an opinion in all cases they decide. 
However, they do not decide all cases they handle, and the reporters do not 
publish all opinions they write. In 2000, for example, district court judges 
cleared about 1,194,000 civil cases.
33
 Of those, about 187,000 were 
―litigation‖ cases.34 Judges wrote decisions (hanketsu) in 80,542 of those 
 
 
 31. See ZEN SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN, supra note 16. 
 32. HANREI TAIKEI [ALL JUDICIAL CASES] (Daiichi Hōki CD-ROM, 2010). 
 33. SHIHO TOKEI NEMPO, 1–MINJI, GYOSEI HEN [ANNUAL REPORT OF JUDICIAL STATISTICS, 1–
CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE], at tbl.1 (Saiko saiban sho jimu so kyoku, 2005).  
 34. Id.  
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civil litigation cases,
35
 and the Hanrei taikei compiled 1,447 of the civil 
decisions.
36
  
To obtain a cohort that reached retirement age by the publication of the 
fourth edition of the ZSKS in 2004, I examine all judges from the LRTI 
classes of 1959, 1960, and 1961. Note that a judge who turned twenty-four 
in 1960 would reach age sixty-five in 2001. Because this group produced 
only three Supreme Court Justices, I add career and productivity 
information on the four Justices appointed from the adjacent classes of 
1957–58 and 1962–63. 
Acquiring the information on the reversal rates and the time from filing 
to judgment for a judge‘s opinions involves a more labor-intensive 
process. Accordingly, I collect this information only on judges from the 
LRTI class of 1960.  
Of the 247 judges in the classes of 1959–61 on which data is available, 
seven were women. None of the women were appointed to either the 
Supreme Court or the presidency of a high court. One served as chief 
judge to a district court. Although I include information on these women 
in this article, I do not focus on the implications of a judge‘s sex on his or 
her promotion. Instead, I discuss that issue in more detail in another 
Article.
37
 
2. Variables 
UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO: 1 if a judge graduated from the University of 
Tokyo, 0 otherwise. 
KYOTO UNIVERSITY: 1 if a judge graduated from the Kyoto University, 
0 otherwise. 
OTHER UNIVERSITY: 1 if a judge did not graduate from either the 
University of Tokyo or Kyoto University, 0 if he did. 
FLUNKS: the number of times a judge failed the entrance examination 
to the LRTI, estimated from his year of birth. 
LOW FLUNKS: 1 if FLUNKS is 2 or fewer, 0 otherwise. 
TDC START: 1 if a judge began his career at the Tokyo District Court, 
0 otherwise. 
SEX: 1 if a judge is male, 0 if female. 
PRODUCTIVITY: the number of district court opinions published by a 
 
 
 35. SHIHO TOKEI NEMPO, 1–MINJI, GYOSEI HEN [ANNUAL REPORT OF JUDICIAL STATISTICS, 1–
CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE], at tbl.20 (Saiko saiban sho jimu so kyoku, 2000).  
 36. See supra note 32.  
 37. Ramseyer, Sex Bias, supra note 15. 
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judge (both single-authored cases and those decided by three-judge 
panels), divided by the number of years he served on a district court. 
TDC PRODUCTIVITY: the number of Tokyo District Court opinions 
published by a judge (both single-authored cases and those decided by 
three-judge panels), divided by the number of years he served on the 
Tokyo District Court. 
PRIV RPTR PRODUCTIVITY: the number of district court opinions 
published by a judge (both single-authored cases and those decided by 
three-judge panels) in one of the two principal private law reporters (the 
Hanrei jihō or the Hanrei taimuzu), divided by the number of years he 
served on a district court. 
TIME-TO-JUDGMENT: the number of years from the year a case is filed 
to the year of the district court decision (LRTI class of 1960 only). 
REVERSAL RATE: the number of published opinions reversed by a 
higher court (in whole or in part), divided by the number of opinions 
published (LRTI class of 1960 only). 
I include selected summary statistics in Table One. 
C. Determinants of Productivity 
1. Talent 
Consider the proposition: (a) If universities, the LRTI, and the 
Secretariat select students, lawyers, and judges for intelligence and effort, 
(b) if smarter and hard-working judges work more productively than 
others, and (c) if those smarter and harder working judges do not 
disproportionately promote out-of-court settlements, then UNIVERSITY OF 
TOKYO, KYOTO UNIVERSITY, FLUNKS, and TDC START should correlate 
with measured PRODUCTIVITY. They do. Table one shows that the 
correlation between PRODUCTIVITY and each of the four measures is .19, -
.03, -.18 and .26, with each significant at the 1% level other than KYOTO 
UNIVERSITY. 
Because of the low pass rate on the LRTI exam, most applicants never 
passed, and those who did pass did so only after many tries. One who 
passed while still in college would graduate from the LRTI at age twenty-
four. Among the 247 judges hired from 1959 to 1961, only ten managed 
this feat. Fifty passed on their second try, and thirty-one passed on their 
third. 
Students who pass selective university admissions tests also tend to 
pass the LRTI exam. Of the 247 judges hired from 1959 to 1961, fifty-six 
attended University of Tokyo and forty-three attended Kyoto University. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/13
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The University of Tokyo graduates failed the LRTI exam 3.70 times, the 
Kyoto University graduates 3.91 times, and the other judges 4.36 times. 
The difference between the two elite schools and the others is significant 
at the 10% level. In the private sector, lawyers typically failed it 6.57 
times.
38
 Of the ten judges who passed the exam on their first try, half had 
attended one of the two elite schools. Of the sixty judges who passed it on 
one of their first two tries, 53% had attended one of the two. 
Of the judges in these 1959–61 classes, twenty started their careers at 
the Tokyo District Court (the fast track). Among these Tokyo-starters, 
45% had attended University of Tokyo and 15% had attended Kyoto 
University (the overrepresentation of University of Tokyo graduates is 
significant at the 1% level). The Tokyo District Court starters failed the 
LRTI exam 2.10 times; the rest failed it 4.31 times (the difference is 
significant at the 1% level). 
In Table Two Regression (1), I regress (through probit) an initial 
appointment to the Tokyo District Court on a judge‘s university, and on 
the number of times he failed the LRTI exam. As the numbers above 
suggest, graduates of the University of Tokyo and judges who failed the 
LRTI exam the fewest times were most likely to start with one of these 
fast-track appointments to the Tokyo District Court. 
The seven women in the classes of 1959–61 failed the LRTI exam a 
mean 4.43 times; none passed the LRTI exam on one of their first two 
tries. One had attended the University of Tokyo, and one had attended 
Kyoto University. None began her career at the Tokyo District Court. 
2. Predicting Productivity 
a. Basic Results 
If the university and LRTI examinations measure cognitive abilities 
and levels of effort relevant to a judge‘s work (and if talented judges do 
not settle rather than decide cases), then—as noted immediately above—
the more talented judges (measured by these variables) should publish 
substantially more opinions. They do.
39
 University of Tokyo graduates 
publish more than one-and-a-half times as many opinions as the others.
 
 
 38. Nakazato, Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 1, at 474. 
 39. Using a different data set and focusing on the most senior judge of a panel (the judge with the 
responsibility for trial management), Ramseyer finds that judges from elite university backgrounds and 
judges who passed the LRTI exam quickly publish substantially more opinions than the others. 
Ramseyer, Talent Matters, supra note 15. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1696 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:1681 
 
 
 
 
TABLE TWO: PREDICTING FIRST APPOINTMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY
40
 
 
A. Regressions: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 First 
TDC 
Dist Court 
Productivity 
TDC  
Prod‘y  
Priv Rptr 
Prod‘y 
      
Tokyo U .077** 
(2.08) 
.868*** 
(2.92) 
.742** 
(2.50) 
1.210 
(1.59) 
.476*** 
(2.59) 
Kyoto U -.0007 
(0.02) 
.173 
(0.52) 
.152 
(0.46) 
.309 
(0.29) 
.177 
(0.87) 
Flunks -.020*** 
(2.93) 
-.087** 
(2.50) 
-.070** 
(2.01) 
-.013 
(0.10) 
-.031 
(1.42) 
TDC Start   1.149*** 
(2.74) 
1.064 
(1.12) 
.698*** 
(2.68) 
 
n 245 209 209 122 209 
Regression Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Adj/Pseudo R2 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.08 
Notes: Regression (1) gives the marginal effects of a probit regression. The 
parenthetical number below the coefficient gives the absolute value of the t or z statistics. 
***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
The judges are from the classes of 1959–61 only, and Regressions (2) through (5) 
include only those judges who stayed on the bench at least ten years.  
All regressions include a constant term.  
 
B. Selected Summary Statistics (Classes of 1959–61): 
 Mean 
DC Prod‘y 
Mean 
TDC Prod‘y 
Mean 
Priv Rptr Prod‘y 
Tokyo U grads 2.30 3.75 1.29 
Kyoto U grads 1.61 2.77 0.92 
Low Flunks 2.13 3.34 1.11 
TDC Starters 3.20 4.10 1.82 
Other University 1.41 2.42 0.78 
 
 
 40. See supra Table 1. 
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More specifically, among the 1959–61 judges, Tokyo graduates published 
2.30 opinions per year on the district court bench, while the rest published 
1.54, as shown in Table Two (the difference is significant at the 1% 
percent level). Kyoto University graduates published 1.61 opinions per 
year (the difference is not significant). 
Those who passed the LRTI exam on one of their first three tries 
published 2.13 opinions, while the others published 1.47 (the difference is 
significant at the 1% level). Those who started at the Tokyo District Court 
published 3.20 opinions, while the others published 1.58 (again significant 
at the 1% level). Parenthetically, note that men published 1.75 opinions 
per year, while women published 0.58 (significant at the 10% level). 
In Table Two Regressions (2) and (3), I regress PRODUCTIVITY on 
these various background characteristics. TOKYO U, FLUNKS, and TDC 
START is each strongly significant.  
b. Robustness Check I
41
  
Perhaps, however, the higher publication rates for these elite judges 
reflect not their talent but their post. The logic proceeds in two steps. First, 
perhaps the Secretariat disproportionately appoints its favored judges 
(favored for whatever reason) to Tokyo. University of Tokyo graduates in 
the 1959–61 classes did spend a mean 4.84 years in the Tokyo District 
Court, for example, while the others spent only 2.81 years (the difference 
is significant at the 1% level). 
Second, perhaps litigants disproportionately file the most newsworthy 
cases in the big cities. If so, then the case reporters will disproportionately 
publish cases from Tokyo. The 1959–61 judges did publish 2.88 opinions 
per year when in the Tokyo District Court, but only 1.71 opinions per year 
in district courts generally.
42
 If the Secretariat appointed its most favored 
judges to Tokyo and the Tokyo courts heard the most interesting cases, 
then PRODUCTIVITY would correlate with the indices of favor even if the 
favored judges wrote no more opinions than anyone else. 
This counterhypothesis does not hold. The judges with the 
conventional measures of talent published more opinions than the others, 
even within the Tokyo District court. Again, University of Tokyo 
graduates published one-and-a-half times as many opinions as the others, 
even if I limit the sample to judges serving on the Tokyo District Court. 
 
 
 41. I use the same test, and obtain the same result, in an earlier study based on a completely 
separate data set of medical malpractice opinions. See Ramseyer, Talent Matters, supra note 15. 
 42. See supra Table 1. 
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University of Tokyo judges published 3.75 opinions per year while on the 
Tokyo District Court; the others published 2.48
43
 (the difference is 
significant at the 10% level). The judges who passed the LRTI exam 
within three years published 3.34 opinions per year in the Tokyo District 
Court, while the others published 2.58 (not significant). And those who 
started at the Tokyo District Court published 4.10, while the others 
published 2.66 (not significant). 
More rigorously, in Table Two Regression (4), I regress TDC 
PRODUCTIVITY on my measures of talent. Because only about half the 
judges spent time in the Tokyo District Court, the database is much 
smaller. In turn, this reduces the statistical significance of the results. 
Although the coefficients are no longer statistically significant, note that 
their signs are in the same direction. For the most part, the magnitudes of 
the coefficients are close to those in Regression (3) as well. Even among 
the judges in the Tokyo courts, the University of Tokyo graduates seem to 
publish more opinions than the rest.  
c. Robustness Check II 
Alternatively, perhaps the process by which trial opinions are selected 
for publication biases my numbers. Commercial legal reporters such as 
Hanrei jihō and Hanrei taimuzu publish some court opinions in Japan—
namely, those that the editors think will sell subscriptions. Official 
government reporters publish the rest. The way that the official reporters 
select their cases varies by court, but generally the judge who writes the 
opinion proposes it for publication to the local court‘s publication 
committee. Unless the committee thinks the opinion lacks precedential 
value, it approves it for publication. By some accounts, the local 
committees approve most publication requests.  
Because of this process, PRODUCTIVITY will conflate quality and 
quantity. A judge with high measured PRODUCTIVITY did not just write 
many opinions. He wrote many opinions that the commercial editors and 
the local court publication committees thought were worth publishing. 
Obviously, this conflation of quality with quantity does not threaten the 
conclusions in this study. If anything, it instead strengthens my claim that 
the Japanese courts promote the highest-quality judges. 
Hypothetically, however, the process by which the courts select 
opinions for their official government reporters could introduce a 
 
 
 43. See supra Table 2. 
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school-clique bias. Hypothetically, judges who graduated from the 
University of Tokyo on the local publication committee could try to favor 
their fellow Tokyo graduates by disproportionately selecting their opinions 
for publication. If so, then high-productivity figures would not reflect true 
productivity; they would simply reflect the school the judge attended. 
To test this possible bias at the court publication committees, I 
construct PRIVATE REPORTER PRODUCTIVITY: the number of district court 
opinions a judge published in the two principal private commercial 
reporters, the Hanrei jihō and the Hanrei taimuzu, divided by the number 
of years he served on a district court. The editors of these reporters care 
only about selling magazines, not about favoring University of Tokyo or 
Kyoto University graduates. For the classes of 1959–61 judges, these two 
private reporters published almost exactly half of all published opinions.  
In fact, the publication process does not bias my results. The 
correlation between productivity measured by those opinions published in 
the two private reporters and productivity measured by all other opinions 
is 0.57, significant at more than the 1% level. What is more, University of 
Tokyo graduates publish half again as much as the others, even within the 
two private law reporters.
44
 The judges who passed the LRTI exam within 
three years published more than the rest, and so did those who started at 
the Tokyo District Court. 
In Table Two Regression (5), I regress this PRIVATE REPORTER 
PRODUCTIVITY on the university variables, FLUNKS, and TDC START. 
FLUNKS loses statistical significance, but UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO and 
TDC START remain significant at more than the 1% level. Whether 
measured by all opinions or only by those in the private commercial 
reporters, Tokyo University graduates publish substantially more than the 
others. School bias at the court publication committees does not explain a 
judge‘s observed productivity. 
D. Determinants of Supreme Court Appointment 
1. Talent 
The Prime Minister named judges to the Supreme Court who brought 
indices of talent already visible on the day it hired them. The judges came 
from prominent schools. Among the seven Justices from the classes of 
1957–63, the Prime Minister appointed two from among the University of 
 
 
 44. See supra Table 2. 
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Tokyo alumni and four from the Kyoto University alumni. He appointed 
judges who had failed the LRTI exam a mean 1.00 times (the other judges 
failed it 4.17 times), and 71% of whom had begun their careers at the 
Tokyo District Court (only 7% of the other judges had). 
2. Productivity: Summary Statistics 
Although the judges named to the Supreme Court brought these 
obvious indices of talent, the Cabinet seems not to have relied on those 
indices. Instead, it appointed to the Supreme Court those judges who 
proved most productive on the bench. It did not favor University of Tokyo 
graduates because of their school backgrounds. Instead, it happened to 
name them only because it searched for the most productive judges, and 
Tokyo graduates were disproportionately among them.  
I begin with some summary statistics. The Prime Minister named to the 
Supreme Court judges who had been spectacularly productive on the 
bench. The average judge not named to the Supreme Court published 1.66 
opinions per year while on a district court. The typical University of 
Tokyo graduate published 2.30. The seven judges named to the Supreme 
Court averaged 6.36 opinions per year. Two of the seven published an 
unremarkable one to two opinions per year. The other five averaged 
between six and eleven. On the Tokyo District Court, these seven 
hyperproductive judges published 8.96 opinions per year.
45
 
 
 
 45. I focus on these seven because they are rough contemporaries of the three classes on which I 
have aggregate data. If (as seems likely) publication rates and practices changed over the years (the 
number of published opinions rose dramatically from 1950 to 1970), then comparing the measured 
PRODUCTIVITY of Supreme Court appointees spanning a longer period would not yield trustworthy 
results. Note, however, that by 2002, twenty judges educated after World War II had been appointed to 
the Supreme Court. Of the twenty, twelve had attended the University of Tokyo. The twenty had a 
mean FLUNKS of 1.95. The seven appointees used in the regressions had a measured PRODUCTIVITY of 
7.81, while the other thirteen postwar appointees (most of whom had joined the courts before the seven 
others) had a measured PRODUCTIVITY of 2.89. The twenty appointees as a whole had a mean 
PRODUCTIVITY of 4.37. 
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TABLE THREE: PREDICTING SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS
46
 
A. Regressions: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Appointment to Supreme Court 
Tokyo U .030 
(0.49) 
.007 
(0.41) 
.0003 
(0.87) 
.0009 
(0.27) 
Kyoto U .580* 
(1.93) 
.459* 
(1.77) 
1.415* 
(1.64) 
.098* 
(1.73) 
Flunks -.029* 
(1.65) 
-.005 
(1.26) 
-.00001 
(1.48) 
-.002 
(1.53) 
TDC Start 1.781*** 
(2.97) 
.437** 
(2.19) 
.017* 
(1.87) 
.180** 
(2.28) 
Dist Ct Prod‘y  .003** 
(2.43) 
  
TDC Productivity   .000007* 
(1.88) 
 
Priv Rptr Prod‘y    .001** 
(2.28) 
n 2.16 213 126 213 
Pseudo R2 0.48 0.60 0.66 0.58 
Notes: Probit regressions giving marginal effects, multiplied by 100. Absolute value of 
the z statistics given below the coefficient. ***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
Supreme Court Justices include Justices appointed from the classes of 1957–58, and 
1962–63. All other judges are from the classes of 1959–61 only and include only those 
judges who stayed on the bench at least ten years.  
All regressions include a constant term.  
B. Selected Summary Statistics: 
  
n 
Mean 
Flunks 
Tokyo 
Univ 
Dist Ct Productivity 
Min Mean Max 
S Ct Justices 7 1.000 .286 1.156 6.362 10.887 
High Ct Presidents 11 1.273 .636 0.900 1.906 4.552 
 (excl. S Ct Justices)     
Dist. Ct. Ch. Judges 72 2.736 .306 0 2.653 11.027 
 (excl. S Ct Justices or High Ct Pres’s)    
All other judges 157–61 5.019 .161  0 1.186 4.934 
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3. Productivity: Probit Regressions 
In Table Three, I examine Supreme Court appointments more 
systematically. In each column, I regress a variable equal to 1 if a judge 
were appointed to the Supreme Court on a series of explanatory variables. 
For each regression, I give the marginal effect of the variable, followed by 
the absolute value of the z-statistic in parenthesis. In Regression (1), I 
regress the variables without a productivity measure. In Regression (2), I 
add DISTRICT COURT PRODUCTIVITY. Consistent with the robustness 
checks described above, in Regression (3), I add TDC PRODUCTIVITY, and 
in Regression (4), I add PRIVATE REPORTER PRODUCTIVITY. 
Crucially, the marginal effect of UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO is 
insignificant in all regressions. When I add productivity measures, 
FLUNKS becomes insignificant as well. KYOTO UNIVERSITY remains 
weakly significant.  
Instead of relying on these indices of talent observable at the outset of a 
judge‘s career, the Prime Minister seems primarily to turn to measures of 
how effectively a judge actually worked. Other than a possible bias toward 
Kyoto University, he does not ask what school a judge attended. He does 
not ask how many times he flunked the LRTI exam. Instead, he asks how 
much work he accomplished on the bench. 
Because none of the women on the lower courts was appointed to the 
Supreme Court, I cannot include SEX in the regressions. Note, however, 
that the least productive judge named to the court still published 1.15 
opinions per year. The most productive woman published 1.81 opinions 
per year (but none during her nearly ten years on the Tokyo District 
Court). The other women published an average of less than one opinion 
per year. 
4. Productivity: Rank Ordering 
For a sense of the extent to which productivity matters, consider Table 
Four. Here, I reproduce selected data on the fifteen most productive judges 
in the dataset. Among the hyperproductive fifteen, PRODUCTIVITY ranges 
from 5.7 to 11 opinions per year—where the classes of 1959–61 averaged 
only 1.7. Symptomatic of the high performance of its graduates, seven of 
the fifteen (47%) had attended the University of Tokyo. Among the judges 
as a whole, only 23% had attended the university. All but two of fifteen 
had failed the LRTI exam three or fewer times, and all but four had failed 
it two or fewer times. Among the judges as a whole, the mean FLUNKS 
was 4.1. 
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TABLE FOUR: FIFTEEN MOST PRODUCTIVE JUDGES
47
 
Rank Name Class School Flunks Product‘y DC 
CJ 
HCt 
Pres 
SCt 
1 Yashushi Tokioka 1959  1 11.027 Yes No No 
2 Akira Machida 1961 U Tokyo 1 10.887 Yes Yes Yes 
3 Takuji Izumi 1963 U Kyoto 0 10.345 Yes Yes Yes 
4 Kazutoshi 
Yamamoto 
1961 U Tokyo 4  8.276 Yes No No 
5 Kaoru Yamashita 1959 U Tokyo 6  8.246 Yes No No 
6 Masahiro Iseki 1961 U Kyoto 1  8.145 Yes No No 
7 Toyozō Ueda 1963 U Tokyo 2  8.110 Yes Yes Yes 
8 Sukeyasu 
Koizumi 
1959 U Tokyo 1  7.688 Yes No No 
9 Norio Yamamoto 1959 U Kyoto 1  6.857 Yes No No 
10 Shōji Shinoda 1960 U Tokyo 2  6.471 Yes No No 
11 Akira Watanabe 1959  3  6.464 Yes No No 
12 Toshiaki Makino 1960  3  6.291 Yes No No 
13 Masao Fujiii 1957 U Kyoto 1  6.203 Yes Yes Yes 
14 Hiroharu 
Kitagawa 
1959 Nagoya U 1  6.151 Yes Yes Yes 
15 Tadashi 
Takahashi 
1960 U Tokyo 3  5.656 Yes No No 
         
95 Shigeru 
Yamaguchi 
1957 U Kyoto 1 1.679 Yes Yes Yes 
142 Toshihiro 
Kanatani 
1960 U Kyoto 2 1.156 Yes Yes Yes 
 
Crucially, five of the seven Supreme Court Justices came from among 
the fifteen most productive judges. Although the sixth Justice, Shigeru 
Yamaguchi, averaged only 1.679 career opinions per year on the district 
court bench, during his 4.3 years on the Tokyo District Court, he averaged 
6.923 opinions per year. By TDC PRODUCTIVITY, he ranked the eighteenth 
most productive judge. Obviously, even he could work fast when 
necessary.  
IV. QUALIFICATIONS 
A. Publication and Docket Clearance 
I do not claim that the Prime Minister looks specifically at the number 
of decisions a judge publishes, and I have not heard any observers in Japan 
 
 
 47. See supra Table 1. 
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make that claim. Instead, he probably looks at variables correlated with 
that publication rate. Observers of the courts most commonly argue that 
the Secretariat promotes judges according to their docket-clearance rates. 
Probably, a judge‘s publication rate correlates with his ability to clear the 
docket. 
Note that the cases that disputants choose to litigate are not a random 
sample of all the quarrels they fight,
48
 and the opinions that reporters 
choose to publish are not a random sample of all opinions judges write. As 
noted earlier, in 2000, Japanese courts disposed of about 187,000 civil 
litigation cases. Judges wrote judgments in about 81,000 of those cases, 
and, according to the Hanrei taikei database, legal reporters published 
1400 of those opinions.
49
  
Hypothetically, judges who publish many opinions might not dispose 
of the largest number of cases. Nonetheless, note that a Tokyo University 
background, low FLUNK scores, initial assignment to the Tokyo District 
Court, and appointment to the Supreme Court all correlate with high 
numbers of published opinions. In itself, this does not prove that 
publication rates also correlate positively with docket clearance rates. It 
does, however, provide indirect suggestive evidence for that proposition: 
PRODUCTIVITY predicts appointment to the Supreme Court because (as 
some observers claim) the Secretariat promotes judges on the basis in part 
of docket-clearance rates, and PRODUCTIVITY proxies for those rates. 
B. The Effect of Delays 
Curiously, although the courts promote judges with high measured 
PRODUCTIVITY, they do not favor judges who publish opinions with the 
shortest measured delays (TIME-TO-JUDGMENT). Among the judges who 
joined the court in 1960, the future Supreme Court Justices decided their 
district court cases only slightly faster than the others: 2.15 years on 
average, rather than 2.43 years. The judges who passed the LRTI exam in 
fewer than three tries were slightly faster than the others (2.33 years rather 
than 2.50 years), while the University of Tokyo graduates were slightly 
slower (2.48 years rather than 2.40 years). Perhaps most important, none 
of these differences is statistically significant.  
In fact, TIME-TO-JUDGMENT and PRODUCTIVITY are correlated 
positively with a correlation coefficient of .20, significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 48. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1984). 
 49. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
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The more productive the judge, the longer the mean TIME-TO-JUDGMENT 
on his opinions. This is not as odd a result as it might initially appear: 
disproportionately, the low PRODUCTIVITY judges were 
―cream-skimming‖ judges who published the easy cases filed during their 
tenure, while the high PRODUCTIVITY judges were ―house-cleaning‖ 
judges who published not just the cases filed during their time on the local 
bench but also a substantial number of older cases filed before they had 
even arrived.
50
  
Consider the contrast between two roughly contemporaneous judges. 
Kunio Motoyoshi joined the court in 1960 and retired in 1996 for a 
position as a notary public. He compiled a record with both low 
PRODUCTIVITY, and low TIME-TO-JUDGMENT. He published seven 
opinions over the course of his fourteen years on the district court bench. 
Three of the opinions reported no filing date, but the other four he 
published expeditiously: a 1964 opinion in a case filed in 1964, a 1969 
opinion in a case filed in 1967, a 1970 opinion in a case filed in 1969, and 
a 1972 opinion in a case filed in 1971.  
By contrast, Akira Machida entered the courts in 1961 and joined the 
Supreme Court in 2001. He published massive numbers of opinions, and 
many of them were in cases that dated from the years before he joined the 
court. In 1962, his second year on the bench, he published nineteen 
opinions, one of them in a case dating from 1960, the year before he 
became a judge. In 1963, he published sixteen opinions, three of them 
from 1960. In 1964, he published twenty-seven opinions, two from 1960, 
two from 1959, and one from 1956. In 1965, he published another sixteen 
opinions, four from 1960, two from 1959, and one from 1957.  
Unlike Motoyoshi, Machida did not just dispose of the cases filed 
under his watch. He cleared a substantial backlog on his court. Because 
that backlog included cases dating from the years before he became a 
judge, his opinions generate a high mean delay figure. He published cases 
with a long measured TIME-TO-JUDGMENT, in short, precisely because he 
accomplished so much work. 
 
 
 50. The result also reflects simple measurement error. About two-thirds of all published district 
court opinions are the work of three-judge panels. As explained in Ramseyer, Talent Matters, supra 
note 15, the speed at which a panel decides a case reflects the efficiency of the most senior judge. 
Because I collect aggregate data on all opinions on which a judge was a panel member, my TIME-TO-
JUDGMENT figure reflects the efficiency of judges other than the one whose data I collect. 
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C. The Effect of Quality 
Hypothetically, the most productive judges might sacrifice quality for 
quantity and make the most mistakes. In real life, they do not. Because 
Japanese courts do not (for the most part) cite other opinions, I can not 
measure quality by citation rates. At least by the cruder metric of 
REVERSAL RATES, however, the most productive judges did not cut 
quality: the correlation coefficient between REVERSAL RATES and 
PRODUCTIVITY is an insignificant .07. 
The REVERSAL RATES of the 1960 judges bound for the Supreme Court 
do not differ significantly from those of the others (5.4% compared to 
4.3%; not significant). The REVERSAL RATES for judges who failed the 
LRTI exam fewer than three times do not differ significantly from those of 
the others (5.4% compared to 3.3%; not significant), and neither do those 
of the judges who began their careers on the Tokyo District Court (4.2% 
compared to 4.3%; not significant). University of Tokyo graduates do 
enjoy slightly lower REVERSAL RATES (2.4% rather than 5.2%), but the 
difference is just barely significant at the 10% level. 
V. OTHER APPOINTMENTS 
A. Introduction 
Given how few judges end their careers on the Supreme Court, as a 
measure of school-clique influence, the test presents a problem of small 
numbers. Consider, therefore, two alternative measures of career success: 
high court presidencies, and district court chief judgeships.
51
 Both are 
capstone appointments for successful judges but more common than an 
appointment to the Supreme Court. Among the 247 judges from the 
classes of 1959–61, three became Supreme Court justices. Eleven became 
high court presidents (but not Supreme Court Justices), and seventy–two 
became district court chief judges (but not Supreme Court Justices or high 
court presidents).  
 
 
 51. See infra Table 5. 
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TABLE FIVE: OTHER CAPSTONE APPOINTMENTS
52
 
 (1) 
Appt to 
Sup Ct 
(2) 
Appt to 
High Ct Pres 
(3) 
Appt to 
Dist Ct Ch J 
Tokyo U  .0001 
 (0.41) 
 .0070** 
 (2.47) 
 .1666* 
 (1.69) 
Kyoto U  .0046* 
 (1.77) 
 .005* 
 (1.95) 
 .0570 
 (0.54) 
Flunks -.0001 
 (1.26) 
-.0002** 
 (2.21) 
-.0845*** 
 (5.02) 
TDC Start  .0044** 
 (2.19) 
 .0346*** 
 (3.81) 
-.0681 
 (0.40) 
Dist C Prod‘y  .00003** 
 (2.43) 
-.00003 
 (0.81) 
 .1361*** 
 (4.28) 
n 213 206 195 
Pseudo R2 0.60 0.57 0.27 
Notes: Probit regressions giving marginal effects. Absolute value of the z statistics 
given below the coefficient. ***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.  
Supreme Court Justices include Justices appointed from the classes of 1957–58, and 
1962–63. All other judges are from the classes of 1959–61 only and include only those 
judges who stayed on the bench at least ten years.  
In Regression (2), I exclude the judges appointed to the Supreme Court. In Regression 
(3), I exclude those judges appointed either to the Supreme Court or to a high court 
presidency. 
All regressions include a constant term.  
As still another measure of school-clique influence, consider initial 
entry onto the judicial fast track: a starting appointment to the Tokyo 
District Court. The Secretariat starts its most promising judges (8.1% of 
the 1959–61 cohort) at this court. In Part V.D. below, I ask whether the 
Secretariat favors University of Tokyo graduates when it appoints judges 
to this track. 
 
 
 52. See supra Table 1. 
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B. High Court Presidents 
The eleven judges in the 1959–61 cohort who became high court 
presidents (but not Supreme Court Justices) were talented men.
53
 Of the 
eleven, seven had attended the University of Tokyo (only 20.6% of the 
other judges attended the school), and three attended Kyoto University 
(16.7% of the others). They had a mean FLUNKS of 1.273, compared to 
4.307 for the others (significant at the 1% level). Seven of the eleven had 
started their careers at the Tokyo District Court, compared to 4.3% of the 
others (significant at the 1% level). 
Although the eleven high court presidents published opinions, they 
were not spectacularly productive. Recall that the men who became 
Supreme Court Justices published 6.362 opinions per year on the District 
Court bench. The eleven who became high court presidents published 
1.906 opinions per year. The rest of the bench published 1.647 opinions 
per year. The high court presidents published more than the other judges, 
but not statistically significantly so.  
Nor is lackluster productivity of the high court presidents peculiar to 
the measure used. While on the Tokyo District Court, the high court 
presidents published 2.099 opinions per year. The other judges (I exclude 
the three who became Supreme Court Justices) published 2.779 opinions 
per year, which is more than the presidents. In the principal private law 
reporters, the future presidents published more than the others—1.206 
opinions per year compared to 0.879 opinions per year—but the difference 
is not statistically significant. 
Because the high court presidents brought very high indices of talent 
but only modestly high measured PRODUCTIVITY, regression analogous to 
that in Table Two yields significant coefficients on the talent variables but 
not on PRODUCTIVITY.
54
 The result is obviously consistent with a story of 
school cliques. It is also, however, consistent with omitted variables: the 
possibility that the Secretariat may be promoting judges on the basis of a 
variable (like docket clearance rate) that correlates only imperfectly with 
my PRODUCTIVITY measure. If it happens not to correlate in the case of 
these eleven high court presidents, then the talent variables will acquire 
statistical significance in its stead. 
 
 
 53. See supra Table 5. 
 54. See supra Table 5, Regression 2. 
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C. District Court Chief Judges 
Of the 247 judges in the 1959–61 classes, only three became Supreme 
Court Justices. Only eleven became high court presidents. A full 
seventy-two became district court chief judges. Precisely because over a 
quarter of the judges receive the appointment, it lacks the prestige of the 
other two capstone positions. For exactly that reason, however, it also 
offers a more statistically reliable test of the impact of any school cliques. 
The judges who became district court chief judges started their careers 
with observable measures of talent. Of the seventy-two future chief 
judges, 30.6% graduated from the University of Tokyo. By contrast, 
57.1% of the Supreme Court Justices and high court presidents had 
attended the school, but only 16.1% of those who finished their careers 
without any of these capstone appointments.
55
 Of the seventy-two, 16.7% 
percent had graduated from Kyoto University, which is nearly identical to 
the fraction among the non-capstone judges. The seventy-two future chief 
judges had a mean FLUNKS score of 2.736, the Supreme Court Justices and 
high court presidents had a mean of FLUNKS of 1.214, and the 
non-capstone judges had a mean 5.019.  
The chief judges were also productive. Where the Supreme Court 
Justices and high court presidents published 2.797 opinions per year while 
on a district court, the chief judges published 2.653 opinions per year. The 
other (non-capstone) judges had a measured PRODUCTIVITY of 1.186 
opinions per year. At the Tokyo District Court, the future Justices and 
presidents published 3.821 opinions per year. The future chief judges 
published 4.342 opinions per year, but the non-capstone judges published 
only 1.629 opinions per year. With the two private reporters, the Justices 
and presidents published 1.633 opinions per year, while the chief judges 
published 1.550 opinions per year and the non-chief judges only 0.571 
opinions per year.  
Table Four presents much the same message. Of the fifteen most 
productive judges in the dataset, every one received a chief judge 
appointment before he retired. Conversely, among the forty least 
productive judges in the data set, only four became chief judges. 
Given these numbers, one would not expect a regression to show a 
strong school-clique effect, and it does not. In Table Five Regression (3), I 
regress appointment to a district court chief judgeship on the university 
variables: FLUNKS, TDC START, and PRODUCTIVITY. PRODUCTIVITY and 
 
 
 55. See supra Table 3. 
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FLUNKS are both strongly significant. KYOTO UNIVERSITY is insignificant, 
and the UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO is just barely significant at the 10% level. 
This last university effect hinges on the productivity measure used. If I use 
TDC PRODUCTIVITY, the marginal effect of the UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO 
becomes a statistically insignificant .114 (z-statistic of 0.94), while the 
productivity measure remains strongly significant at .068 (z-statistic of 
3.35). If I use PRIVATE REPORTER PRODUCTIVITY (arguably a stronger 
measure of quality than PRODUCTIVITY, since it reflects the decision of an 
independent journal to publish the opinion), the marginal effect of 
UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO falls to an insignificant 1.581 (z-statistic of 1.62), 
while the productivity measure remains strongly significant at .213 
(z-statistic of 4.70). 
D. Initial Tokyo District Court Appointments 
Consider an alternative question: whom does the Secretariat name to 
the prestigious fast track starting appointments at the Tokyo District 
Court? Suppose school cliques rigged the appointment. If they did, then 
the University of Tokyo graduates who started their careers on this fast 
track would have been less talented than the other judges who started on 
the same track. Over the course of their careers, they would have 
published fewer opinions. Did they? 
In fact, the opposite is true: over the course of their careers, the 
University of Tokyo graduates who started at the Tokyo District Court 
published more opinions per year (albeit not statistically significantly so) 
than the other judges who started at the same court. The nine University of 
Tokyo graduates published a mean 4.050 opinions per year. The eleven 
other judges published only 2.500 opinions per year. During their various 
stints on the Tokyo District Court during the course of their careers, the 
University of Tokyo graduates published 5.066 opinions per year, while 
the others published 3.314 opinions per year. With the private reporters, 
the Tokyo graduates published 2.427 opinions per year, while the others 
published 1.326 opinions per year.  
In short, the Secretariat did not discriminate in favor of the University 
of Tokyo graduates when it selected new judges for the fast track. If 
anything, it seems to have worried about media accounts of bias and 
discriminated against the University of Tokyo graduates. It appointed 
them to the court only if they showed promise of becoming more 
productive than the others. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
American scholars routinely attribute university cliques to Japanese 
firms and bureaucracies. Disaffected employees from other schools blame 
the cliques for their own career setbacks, newspapers repeat the claims, 
and American scholars take their interviews and the newspaper accounts at 
face value. The graduates of the most selective universities dominate their 
employers, they write. They cause it to hire more alumni from their alma 
mater. They manipulate the internal career tournaments to favor each other 
over the employees from rival schools. 
For most employers, we lack the employee-level measures of output 
we need to test this school-clique hypothesis. For the courts, however, we 
have it. I take data on judicial output. I then ask whether judges from the 
most selective schools are more likely—holding output constant—to end 
their careers on the Supreme Court. For the most part, they are not. 
Although graduates from the most elite schools do capture a significant 
fraction of the Supreme Court seats, they do not capture those seats 
because of their school backgrounds. Primarily, they capture them because 
they accomplish so much work. 
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